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Abstract 
 
 
Recent asset pricing studies demonstrate the relevance of incorporating the coskewness in Asset 
Pricing Models, and illustrate how this component helps to explain the time variation of ex-ante 
market risk premiums. This paper analyzes the role of coskewness in mutual funds performance 
evaluation. We find evidence that adding a coskewness factor is economically and statistically 
significant. We document that some managers are managing the coskewness and show, in general, 
a persistent behaviour on time in their coskewness policy. One of the most striking results is that 
many negative (positive) alpha funds measured relative to the CAPM risk adjustments would be 
reclassified as positive (negative) alpha funds using a model with coskewness. Therefore, a ranking 
of funds based on risk adjusted returns without considering coskewness would generate an 
erroneous classification. Moreover, some fund characteristics, such as the turnover ratio or the 
category, are related to the likelihood of managing coskewness. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the late 1960s, performance measures have been essential tools in the investment process. 
Their importance has increased from the perspective of both the academic and the professional 
investor. A performance measure can be defined as a single formula for evaluating the results 
obtained by an investment portfolio. It allows investors to compare different managers or 
management strategies by ranking portfolios on their performance. In addition, such 
performance measures can be employed to determine the remunerations of mutual fund 
managers according to their past performance. 
 
Classic performance measures have been developed, in general, under the assumption of 
normality in the distribution of returns and have been used in the literature to evaluate the active 
portfolio management of professional managers. Among these measures, we can highlight 
Jensen’s Alpha (Jensen, 1968) from the CAPM, Sharpe’s Ratio (Sharpe, 1966) and the Treynor 
measure (Treynor, 1965). During the 1970s, some authors realized that these traditional 
performance measures did not evaluate fund performance accurately because the distribution of 
funds returns was not Gaussian1. Klemkosky (1973) and Ang and Chua (1979) demonstrated 
that ignoring the third moment of the distribution of returns would generate a bias in the 
evaluation of the fund managers’ performance. This bias could also affect investors directly, by 
leading them to create their portfolios in a manner that would cause a suboptimal asset 
allocation. Along the same lines, other authors such as Prakash and Bear (1986) or Leland 
(1999) have developed performance measures incorporating skewness, and Stephens and 
Proffitt (1991) generalized the performance measure to account for any number of moments. All 
these results indicate that ignoring higher moments could have a significant impact upon the 
performance rankings of these funds. 
 
                                                          
1 In fact, Markowitz (1991) recognizes that the normality assumption is not realistic from a theoretical, 
practical, or empirical perspective, and that other measures, in particular semi-variance, might be more 
plausible. 
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In order to find the best model to evaluate the performance of mutual funds, we must 
review the literature of asset pricing related with coskewness. Thus, Kraus and Litzenberger 
(1976) document the importance of considering the third moment (skewness) of returns in asset 
pricing. They developed a model where investors are compensated for holding systematic risk 
and coskewness risk, such that they require a higher (lower) return whenever the systematic risk 
is higher (lower) and the coskewness risk is lower (higher). The negative price of risk in the 
second component indicates that investors dislike assets with negative coskewness and therefore 
require higher returns. For those readers unfamiliar with coskewness we must indicate that an 
asset with negative coskewness is an asset, such that, incorporating it into a portfolio would add 
negative skewness, increasing the probability of obtaining undesired extreme values (left tail of 
the distribution).  
 
Recent literature on asset pricing has demonstrated the convenience of using 
coskewness models instead of the popular Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. Thus, 
Harvey and Siddique (2000) test the three-moment CAPM’s implication that a stock with a 
negative coskewness with the market will earn a higher risk premium. They formed a 
coskewness factor following the methodology that Fama and French used in constructing the 
SMB and HML factors and found that coskewness is economically significant. Barone-Adesi 
(2004) using a quadratic model find that additional variables representing portfolio 
characteristics (such as those considered in the Fama and French model) have no explanatory 
power for expected returns when coskewness is taken in account. Chung et al (2006) suggest 
that higher order co-moments are important for risk-averse investors concerned about extreme 
outcomes. The authors also find that the risk factors of Fama and French approximate these 
higher order co-moments especially when using low frequencies. In this sense, Vanden (2006) 
also points out that SMB and HML measure coskewness risk, but they are imperfect proxies. 
More recently, Smith (2007) finds that while the conditional two-moment CAPM and the 
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conditional Fama and French three-factor model are rejected, a model which includes 
coskewness is not rejected by the data2. 
 
Given this agreement regarding the importance of coskewness, it seems clear that the 
third moment would have to be used in the evaluation of the performance of Hedge Funds, since 
they can employ dynamic strategies: leverage, short-selling and investing in illiquid assets (see 
Ranaldo and Favre, 2005; and Ding and Shawky, 2007) and therefore the return distribution will 
be clearly non-normal. Nevertheless, it is not so evident that this model also generates changes 
in the performance of common mutual funds, since they cannot make use of all those strategies3. 
In spite of this, some authors (Stephens and Proffitt, 1991; or Moreno and Rodríguez, 2006) 
have taken a first step in analyzing the effect of nonsymmetrical distributions in mutual funds. 
These works find, in general, some differences in performance when these new measures are 
taken into consideration. Nevertheless, neither of them analyzes the implications of coskewness 
in the management and valuation of the investment funds. Moreover, the samples of data used 
in these studies are small, and the number of analyzed funds is reduced4.  
 
Some important questions about the role of coskewness are still unanswered in the 
mutual funds literature. For example, does the average performance of funds change? Are there 
variations in the ranking of mutual fund managers? Are these changes in rankings statistically 
significant, or could some characteristics such as turnover of the portfolio, size, or even the 
category of the fund be related to a certain strategy of management of coskewness? In this paper 
we try to shed some light on all these issues using a sufficiently wide sample in number of funds 
and time period. Thus, we investigate the role of coskewness in portfolio management and study 
                                                          
2 Coskewness is also considered relevant in some other economic areas. For example, Vines et al. (1994) 
study the importance of coskewness in the pricing of real estate and Christie-David and Chaudhry (2001) 
examine it in explaining the return-generating process in future markets. 
3 However it must be noted that fund managers could use, for example, derivatives (as Koski and Pontiff 
(1999) point out approximately 21 percent of equity mutual funds use derivatives) biasing the distribution 
of fund returns to the left or right, generating coskewness in distribution of returns. 
4 For example, Stephens and Proffitt (1991) use a sample consisting of only 27 internationally diversified 
mutual funds from January 1976 to June 1982, and Moreno and Rodríguez (2006) employ only 370 
Spanish mutual funds from January 1999 to January 2003. 
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whether some fund managers are profiting from a coskewness spread. Hereinafter, we will 
understand managing coskewness as having a specific policy regarding the assets incorporated 
into the fund’s portfolio to achieve higher or lower portfolio coskewness.  
 
In order to thoroughly study the relevance of including the third co-moment of asset 
returns in issues of performance evaluation, we consider two different multifactor asset pricing 
models, the CAPM and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model 5. In both models we add a 
coskewness factor and look for the best adjustment of risk6. Our results reveal many interesting 
findings. First, we find that the coskewness factor is both economically and statistically 
significant. Second, the average funds’ performance will change when coskewness is taken into 
account, this change being greater when it is compared with the alpha from a CAPM (the 
average alpha for all Equity funds is moved to the left side more than double) than in a Carhart 
model (the average alpha is modified by approximately 6%). Third, in general, these movements 
in the alpha might affect categories of equity mutual funds in different ways, so that in our 
sample, the Aggressive Growth funds are made to look better and the rest worse. Fourth, as 
those variations in performance will have a different sign depending on the loading on the 
coskewness factor, we find that a ranking based on risk adjusted returns without considering 
coskewness might result in a misleading classification of the funds. Moreover, one of the most 
striking results is that many negative (positive) alpha funds measured relative to the CAPM risk 
adjustments would be reclassified as positive (negative) alpha funds using the CAPM plus 
coskewness. Fifth, those managers having a specific policy of managing coskewness repeat the 
same policy over time, thus, persistence in coskewness policy appears for the majority of the 
                                                          
5 This model has been widely used in the literature to measure mutual funds performance. For example, 
Wermers (2000), Kothari and Warner (2001), Kacperczyk et al. (2005) and Kosowsky et al. (2006), are 
some recent examples of papers employing Carhart's model. 
6 An alternative way to take into account the skewness of the distribution of returns could be in an 
equilibrium framework like that of Leland (1999). However, this performance measure would require two 
assumptions: the rate of return on the market portfolio must be independently and identically distributed 
and perfect markets must exist. Moreover, many of the econometric problems related to the estimation of 
the CAPM alpha will also be presented in estimating this performance measure, including finding an 
appropriate proxy for the market portfolio (as  mentioned in Leland (1999), footnote 22). In contrast, 
multifactor pricing models, such as the ones proposed in this paper are not subject to those problems. 
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time periods. Sixth, we find that some funds’ characteristics (turnover and fund’s category) are 
related to having a specific policy of managing the coskewness.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The following section describes the 
coskewness measure and the models used to analyze its effect on performance evaluation. 
Section 3 presents the database of mutual funds and the benchmarks used. Section 4 provides 
the empirical evidence. Summaries and conclusions are presented in Section 5. 
 
2. The effect of the coskewness factor on performance evaluation  
 
2.1. The coskewness 
Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) extend the CAPM to incorporate the effect of skewness in asset 
pricing, developing the three-moment CAPM (3MCAPM). Thus, in equilibrium, the expected 
returns of a risk asset satisfy:  
iifi RR γλβλ 21 +=− ,      (1) 
 
where iR  is one plus the expected return of the risk asset, fR  denotes one plus the return of the 
risk free asset, iβ  is the systematic risk and iγ  indicates the systematic skewness (standardised 
coskewness) of the asset, a measure of the asset’s coskewness risk 7. The risk premiums of each 
risk factor are 1λ and 2λ . Therefore, investors are compensated by means of expected excess 
returns for bearing the relative risks measured by beta and gamma. Given that the investor 
requires higher returns for securities with higher betas, we expect a positive risk 
                                                          
7 According to Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) the expressions are:  
( )( )[ ]
( )[ ]2MM MMiii RRE RRRRE − −−=β   and  
( )( )[ ]
( )[ ]3
2
MM
MMii
i
RRE
RRRRE
−
−−=γ
 , where iγ  is defined as the ratio of the coskewness of that asset’s return with the 
market to the market’s skewness. In the same way that the covariance (numerator of beta) represents the 
marginal contribution of an asset to the variance of the market portfolio return, the coskewness 
(numerator of gamma) represents the contribution of an asset to the skewness of the market portfolio 
return. 
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premium 01 >λ . However, we expect a negative risk premium for assets with positive 
systematic skewness 02 <λ . 
 
From an empirical point of view, asset pricing models can be tested through the 
restrictions that they impose on the coefficients of the return generating process. Thus, the 
return generating processes consistent with the CAPM and the 3MCAPM are the market model 
and the quadratic model, respectively. Whereas the market model assumes that the return of a 
risk asset is linearly related to the return of a stock index representative of the market, the 
quadratic model establishes a nonlinear relationship expressed as: 
[ ] [ ] ittMtMitftMiitfti RRcRRccRR ν+−+−+=− 2,,2,,10,, .   (2) 
 
The estimation of ic2  in the quadratic model (2) gives us a coskewness measure. 
Through the use of a partitioned regressions argument (Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem) it is easy 
to verify that c2i is equal to )(V)(E 2 1t,M
2
1t,M1t,i +++ εεε , where 1+t,iε  represents the residuals from 
the regression of the excess return on the contemporaneous market excess return and 1, +tMε  
represents the residuals of the excess market return over its mean. 
 
Harvey and Siddique (2000) compute the standardized unconditional coskewness as 
)()(
)(
2
1,
2
1,
2
1,1,
++
++=
tMti
tMti
i
EE
E
S εε
εε
,     (3) 
 
where 1, +tMε  and 1+t,iε were defined previously in this section. The information given by the 
coskewness allows the construction of a risk factor in the same way that the Fama and French 
(1993) factors were constructed. This risk factor can be replicated by means of a portfolio of 
assets. In order to elaborate on this factor, we need to compute the coskewness measure for each 
asset and use it to rank the assets. They form two portfolios: one which comprises of  the 30% 
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of the assets that have the most negative coskewness ( −S ) and another which comprises of  the 
30% of the assets with the most positive coskewness ( +S ). The return spread of the two 
portfolios )SS( +− −  and the return spread of the portfolio −S  minus the risk free rate 
)RS( f−− are the coskewness risk factors (hereinafter, CSK).   
 
2.2. The Models 
In order to analyze the effect of the coskewness factor on performance evaluation, we use as 
base cases the standard CAPM and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, which uses the three 
factors of Fama and French (1993) and an additional one that captures the momentum effect. 
We use the four-factor model (hereinafter FF4) to adjust the performance of the fund for the 
regularities found in financial returns. Thus, the models are 
[ ] t,it,ft,Mmiit,ft,i eRRRR +−β+α=−      (4) 
 
[ ] t,itwmlithmlitsmbit,ft,Mmiit,ft,i eWMLHMLSMBRRRR +β+β+β+−β+α=− ,  
 (5) 
 
where{ }tttt,ft,M WML,HML,SMB,RR −  represents the market, size, book and momentum 
factors.  
When a coskewness factor is included, we have  
[ ] t,itcskit,ft,Mmiit,ft,i eCSKRRRR +β+−β+α=−      (6) 
 
[ ] t,itcskitwmlithmlitsmbit,ft,Mmiit,ft,i eCSKWMLHMLSMBRRRR +β+β+β+β+−β+α=−
  (7) 
 
To study the effect of adding this new factor to the traditional Jensen’s alpha, we must 
consider the coskewness risk in the same way as the systematic market risk. Just as we require 
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greater returns for managers with larger systematic risks (larger betas), in a model that includes 
coskewness we require greater returns for managers whose coskewness risks are larger. To 
illustrate, suppose that we are evaluating two mutual funds with an annual abnormal return of 
3% (measured by the classic Jensen’s alpha, αA=αB=0.03). Manager A has over-weighted the 
portfolio with assets that have negative coskewness, and has therefore obtained a spread by 
coskewness, whereas Manager B has not given special consideration to coskewness. According 
to (6), the loading parameter that captures the coskewness risk must be positive for Manager A 
(e.g. 20.0CSK =β ) and zero for Manager B. Given that the coskewness factor must have a 
positive mean (e.g. 0.10) – because investors dislike negative coskewness assets and they 
require greater returns – the final alpha for Manager A will be lower than the alpha for Manager 
B. Therefore, the abnormal return obtained would be )CSK(2AA,CSK β−α=α  
01.0)10.0(2.003.0 =−=  for Manager A and 03.0)CSK(2BB,CSK =β−α=α  for Manager 
B.  
 
In this example, the manager who tries to profit from the coskewness spread achieves 
the worse performance. The reason is that alpha is a performance measure that considers risk-
adjusted returns, so that just as greater returns are required of a manager assuming larger market 
risk (and therefore a greater βm, reducing his Jensen’s alpha), greater returns are required of the 
manager assuming a larger systematic risk of skewness. To complete the argument, it is 
important to note that Manager A adds negative skewness to the portfolio by incorporating 
negative coskewness assets – an undesirable situation for investors. Thus, a correct measure of 
abnormal returns must penalize this strategy. 
 
 
 
2.3 Conditional performance evaluation 
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The models explained above use unconditional expected returns and are based on the 
assumption that factor loadings are constant. However, if expected returns and risks vary over 
time, such an unconditional approach may give biased results. Chen and Knez (1996) and 
Ferson and Schadt (1996) advocate conditional performance evaluation (CPE). In their one- and 
multi-factor models, factor loadings (betas) are conditioned on public information variables. 
The obtained conditional Jensen’s alphas represent the average difference between the return on 
a fund and the return of the dynamic strategies based on public information8.  
 
Thus, in this paper, we analyze the previous models in a conditional and unconditional 
framework, given the existing evidence that asset pricing models need to be conditional since 
expected returns vary over time. With this analysis we also contribute to conditional 
performance evaluation literature by presenting the differences between conditional and 
unconditional performance evaluation when coskewness is included.  
 
3.  Data and benchmarks 
 
3.1. Fund Returns 
The database used in this study consists of monthly returns for 6,819 U.S. equity mutual funds 
obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) between January 1962 and 
December 2006. These mutual funds are classified into three categories: Aggressive Growth, 
Growth Income Funds and Long-Term Growth Funds. 
 
Table 1 provides a complete economic and statistical description of the database. Using 
rows for each category, we present annualized mean return, risk (measured as the standard 
deviation), kurtosis, minimum and maximum monthly return during the entire sample period, 
and the percentage of funds for which the null hypothesis of normality, using a Jarque-Bera test, 
                                                          
8 Christopherson et al. (1998) proposed a refinement of the conditional performance evaluation. 
Introducing time variation in alpha makes it possible to determine whether managerial performance is 
indeed constant or varies over time as a function of the conditional information. 
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is rejected. The table also shows the total number of mutual funds in each category in intervals 
of 36-84, 84-120, 120-156, 156-288, more than 288 and more than 432 observations. 
 
The figures in Table 1 indicate that the kurtosis is, on average, higher than 3 (a value 
under the null of a normal distribution) and we reject the null hypothesis of normality for 
approximately 48% of mutual funds (51% in Aggressive Growth, 53% in Growth Income Funds 
and 44% in Long-Term Growth Funds). According to this result, the use of a performance 
measure based on normality should be questioned.  
 
3.2. Benchmarks Portfolios 
We use the CRSP NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ value-weighted index as the market portfolio. To 
capture the effects of size, book-to-market value and momentum we use the monthly series of 
SMB and HML and WML factors obtained from Kenneth French’s website. Our short-term risk 
free security is the one-month Treasury bill, from Ibbotson Associates. The predetermined 
variables, used as instruments in conditional models are: 1) the lagged level of the one-month 
Treasury bill yields; 2) the lagged dividend yield of the CRSP value –weighted NYSE/AMEX 
and NASDAQ stock index; 3) a lagged measure of the slope of the term structure; and 4) a 
lagged corporate spread on the corporate bond market. The term spread is a constant maturity 
10-year Treasury bond yield minus the 3-month T-bill yield. The corporate bond default yield 
spread is Moody’s BAA – rated corporate bond yield, minus the AAA-rated corporate bond 
yield. These variables have figured most prominently in studies of mutual fund performance 
(see Ferson and Schadt 1996; Ferson and Warther, 1996). 
 
Table 2 presents summary statistics on the risk factors. The mean, median and standard 
deviation return data are in annual percentages. In addition, we show the monthly maximum and 
minimum return, and the p-value of the Jarque-Bera test. The market factor is the excess return 
on the value-weighted index; SMB is the factor mimicking portfolio for size; HML is the factor 
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mimicking portfolio for book-to-market, WML is the factor mimicking portfolio for the 1-
month return momentum; )SS( +− −  and )RS( f−− are the coskewness factors. 
 
In order to compute the coskewness factor we use monthly U.S. equity returns from 
CRSP NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ files from December 1957 to December 2006. We include 
ordinary common stocks and exclude real state investment trusts, stocks of companies 
incorporated outside of the United States and close-end funds.  For robustness, we investigate 
various specifications of the coskewness factor to ensure that it is not sensitive to its 
construction methodology. Thus, we use various cut-off definitions (bottom 15% - top 15%; and 
bottom 20% - top 20%) in addition to the Harvey and Siddique’s factor (bottom 30% - top 
30%). Moreover, we also compute these factors by employing the parameter c2 from the 
quadratic model (2) to sort the common stocks instead of using the standardised unconditional 
coskewness (3) proposed by Harvey and Siddique 9. 
 
The risk premium for all these coskewness factors is positive, becoming higher as the 
cut-off is more extreme. The risk premiums for the )SS( +− −  are 3.44%, 3.19%, and 2.33% 
annually for the 15-15, 20-20 and 30-30 cut-offs respectively, and range from 8.9% to 8.30% 
annually in the case of the )RS( f−−  coskewness factor. Constructing the coskewness factor 
from the quadratic model, the premiums, for the different cut-offs, are 3.52% 2.74%, and 2.56% 
respectively for the )SS( +− − , and 9.94%, 9.01, and 8.73 for the )RS( f−−  factor.  
  
In order to analyze the potential impact of the factors when they were added to the 
models, we compute the correlation coefficient among all of them. The correlation among the 
same coskewness factor using different cut-offs is very high (e.g. for the )SS( +− −  15-15 and 
20-20 the correlation is 0.94), allowing us to conclude that the factor is not sensitive to the 
                                                          
9 The authors are grateful to an anonymous referee for their comments on this section, which have led to 
substantial improvements in the paper.
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selection of different cut-offs. In addition, the correlation between the factors computed using 
different measures of coskewness is also high (e.g. for the )SS( +− −  30-30 from the Harvey 
and Siddique measure and the measure from the quadratic model is 0.85). Therefore, the 
coskewness factor is robust to the different ways of measuring the coskewness. In consequence, 
for the rest of the paper we will show the results only considering two factors )SS( +− −  and 
)( fRS −− , where coskewness is computed using (3) and with the intermediate cut-off 20-2010.  
 
Table 2 also presents the contemporaneous correlations between the factors included in 
the models. As we can observe, these correlations are generally small; they range from -0.40 to 
0.37. But there is one case in which correlation is not negligible: when the existing correlation 
between the market factor and the coskewness factor )RS( f−− is 0.913. In order to avoid 
possible multicollinearity problems, we orthogonalize this coskewness factor with respect to the 
market factor. One we have orthogonalized this factor, the correlation with the market changes 
to zero, and the correlation with the other coskewness factor )SS( +− −  changes to 0.90 
(whereas before it was only 0.37), corroborating again the robustness of the coskewness factor 
used here.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1 The coskewness of mutual funds 
Table 3 reports some summary statistics that compare the coskewness measures across the three 
categories of funds analyzed in this paper. In Panel A we show the unconditional skewness, 
computed as the third central moment over the mean. The results indicate that, considering all 
funds jointly, half of the funds have a negative skewness, significant at the 5% level11. For each 
                                                          
10 The results for the rest of the specifications of the coskewness factor are very similar and are available 
upon request.  
11 Significance levels for unconditional skewness and coskewness are computed based on bootstrap 
percentiles methodology (for a more detailed description of this methodology see Efron and Tibshirani, 
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of the categories, these percentages are 42%, 61% and 49% respectively. This result shows that 
the skewness of the funds is significant and that the third moment of the return distribution 
should not be ignored. In Panel B we present the results of measuring the unconditional 
coskewness of the mutual funds. The mean value for all Equity Mutual Funds is negative (-
0.013) and the proportion of funds that have a significant coskewness is, on average, 19.63%. 
Moreover, it can be observed that each category has a different standardized unconditional 
coskewness, with the Aggressive Growth being the only one having a negative average 
coskewness (-0.063) and further, having the greatest number of funds with negative 
unconditional coskewness (16%). Given that a mutual fund is a portfolio of assets, this finding 
indicates that approximately 16% of those mutual funds are created investing in assets with 
negative coskewness and therefore, the required return of these funds according to the 
3MCAPM should be higher. When we estimate the quadratic model (2) as an alternative 
measure of coskewness, the results are similar to those found in Panel B. The mean value 
estimated for the parameter C2, shown in panel C, is negative when all categories are considered 
together and the percentage of funds with a significant parameter is around 10%. Again, the 
Aggressive Growth category shows a negative value (-0.531) on average and Growth Income 
and Long-Term Growth funds present a positive one.  
  
The figures in Table 3 might give the impression that very few funds exhibit significant 
coskewness, and, as a result, the impact of coskewness could be marginal. Given that the main 
goal of the paper is to analyze the importance of coskewness as an additional factor in 
performance evaluation, it is interesting to report the funds’ exposure to the coskewness factor 
rather than in the coskewness measures. The sensitivities to the coskewness factor depend on 
the factor and the funds used. But, in general, the average betas differ significantly from zero for 
all categories and factors. So, using the )( +− − SS factor, between 58% and 64% of the funds 
                                                                                                                                                                          
1993), and we find they are -0.40 and 0.40 for the unconditional skewness and -0.20 and 0.20 for the 
unconditional coskewness at the 5% level.  
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are statistically significant. When we use the factor )RS( f−−  these percentages change to 36% 
and 58%.12  
 
Hence, the results suggest that coskewness could play an important role in explaining 
the performance evaluation of mutual funds and implies that a disregard for this feature will 
create a bias – perhaps a significant one – in assessing performance evaluation. We test this 
hypothesis in the following section.  
  
4.2. The performance evaluation of mutual funds 
The results of the time-series estimation for the models are reported in Tables 4.a to 4.d (the 
first table reporting all funds jointly and subsequent tables reporting each category of mutual 
funds). Rows 1, 2 and 3 of the tables show the unconditional estimation of CAPM and the 
CAPM plus the coskewness factors. The four-factor model of Carhart (1997) and the same 
model plus the coskewness factors are in rows 4, 5 and 6. For each model, we report alpha, 
beta(s), the adjusted R2 of the regressions and the likelihood ratio test. 
 
An interesting result from Tables 4.a to 4.d, is that, in general, for all the categories of 
funds used in this paper and for all models, the average coefficient obtained for the CSK factor 
is statistically different from zero. The values range from -0.09 to 0.10 using )( +− − SS , and 
from -0.15 to 0.17 with )RS( f−− , depending on the category and the model analyzed. In 
addition to statistical significance, we must study the economic significance. As the coskewness 
factor is an excess return, we can calculate an approximate value of the coskewness risk 
premium by multiplying the loadings on the factor by the sample average return of the 
coskewness portfolio (3.19% when considering the factor, )( +− − SS  ). Thus, the average 
coskewness risk premium ranges from -0.29% to 0.32%.  
                                                          
12 These figures are calculated by regressing the fund excess return of each fund on the spread between 
the returns on the )( +− − SS  or )RS( f−−  portfolios. 
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In Table 4a, where all funds are analyzed jointly, there is a slight increase in the R2 
value when we use a coskewness factor as an additional explanatory variable; this increase 
being from 0.76 to 0.78 or 0.79 when we incorporate the coskewness factors in the 
unconditional CAPM, and from 0.84 to 0.85 when we include it in the unconditional FF4 
model.  
 
The last column in Tables 4.a to 4.d reports a standard likelihood ratio (LR) test in order 
to determine whether there is a statistically significant difference between the explanatory 
power of the new model with coskewness and the previous model. The introduction of this extra 
factor leads to an increase in log-likelihood, indicating the relevance of the coskewness. We find 
that the explanatory power of the coskewness model increases significantly over each 
corresponding model without this new factor, this being especially relevant in the case of the 
Aggressive Growth and Growth Income funds for every model, and in the Long-Term Growth 
category only for the CAPM.  Therefore, if we do not incorporate the effect of the systematic 
skewness, we may create a potential problem of specification that biases the risk-adjusted-return 
obtained by mutual funds.   
 
Tables 4a to 4d also report the average alphas and their t-statistic. In general they are 
close to zero and negative except for the estimation of the CAPM for the Aggressive Growth 
category where the alphas are positive. Although the average alphas are not statistically 
significant in any case, the economic significance of the effect of coskewness on the 
performance of a fund is not negligible. For example, from Table 4.a, if we compare the mean 
alpha from CAPM and that from CAPM+CSK (using ( +− − SS )), we find that alpha decreases 
by -0.024, from -0.017 to -0.041, percent per month after coskewness is controlled. Thus, the 
net effect of coskewness on alpha is approximately 0.28% (0.024*12) annually. 
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However, it must be noted that the average change in performance, measured by alpha, 
is not uniform across categories and models. Firstly, when we include coskewness in the 
CAPM, the change in alpha is always greater than when it is included in the FF4 model. 
Secondly, comparing performance among different categories we observe that, in general, 
taking into account the coskewness makes funds belonging to the Growth Income and Long-
Term Growth categories look worse, but funds in the Aggressive Growth category look better. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that looking only at average alphas may erroneously lead to 
the conclusion that the economic impact of coskewness on performance is negligible.  This is 
due to the fact that within a fund sample, there may exist managers with a positive beta for the 
coskewness factor (which would imply a decrease in alpha, as these funds have greater exposure 
to assets with negative coskewness - undesirable for the investor) and managers with a negative 
beta for the coskewness factor (which would imply an increase in alpha). Therefore, coskewness 
may have a negligible impact on the average alpha, even if its effect on individual alphas is 
significant. This argument suggests that a more detailed analysis is needed to assess the impact 
of coskewness on performance. In particular, the analysis should pay special attention to the 
coskewness management strategy implemented by fund managers. In the following subsection, 
the funds will be grouped according to their sensitivity to the coskewness factor. 
 
The estimation of the conditional models presented in Table 5 shows the signs for the 
loadings on the coskewness factors are the same as in the unconditional estimations, and also 
they are statistically significant. According to the LR-test we can, in general, accept that there is 
a statistically significant increment in the explanatory power of the model with coskewness, this 
being clearer in the CAPM models than in the FF4 ones, and for the Growth Income category. 
We also perform an F-test for the marginal explanatory power of conditioning information in 
the models. In our sample, from the F-test we can conclude that the instruments considered 
together are not significant at the 5% level13 . Therefore, given that the conditional models seem 
                                                          
13 Ferson and Schadt (1996) in a different sample from 1968 to 1990 find p-values of 0.06 for this test.  
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not to contribute significantly, for the rest of the paper we will focus on the unconditional 
models.  
 
In Table 6 we display the distribution of the t-statistics for alpha coefficients, to analyze 
whether the coskewness factor significantly changes the distribution of alphas.  The figures in 
each column of the body of the table are the percentages of mutual funds in which the t-statistics 
for the alphas fall within the range of values indicated in the far left-hand column. Panel A of 
Table 6 reports the unconditional models using the CAPM as a base case and Panel B the 
unconditional FF4 model. In general, when the systematic skewness is considered, we observe 
that the distribution of the alphas moves slightly to the left side, indicating that the coskewness 
factor makes the average performance of the fund managers look worse.  
 
If the coskewness factor is added to the unconditional CAPM the percentage of negative 
and significant alphas increases by between 1% and 8%, depending on the category of funds. 
The larger increases from 21% to 29% are obtained in the Growth Income funds when the 
factor )( fRS −− is used (and from 21% to 27% with the other one). This movement to the left 
side is also demonstrated by the FF4 model (e.g. the percentage of negative and significant 
alphas increases from 21% to 23% when all funds are considered jointly and for the )( fRS −−  
factor of coskewness). Moreover, in this case the effect of coskewness is different depending on 
the category. While in Growth Income the negative and significant alphas increases from 21% 
to 23%, in the Aggressive Growth category it decreases from 20% to 17%, for both factors.  
 
4.3 The effect of coskewness depending on the coskewness policy 
As stated in the previous section, the net effect of considering coskewness over the mutual 
funds performance cannot be analyzed only by the changes in the average alpha, given that 
different mutual funds have different exposure to the coskewness factor. Thus, funds with 
negative sensitivity to the coskewness factor add assets with positive coskewness to their 
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portfolios and, therefore, investors will demand lower returns on these funds. The average alpha 
(adjusted by the risk of coskewness) should then be higher. However, those funds that 
incorporate negative coskewness assets, must present a positive beta of coskewness and an 
investor will demand higher returns due to the higher risk of coskewness and the adjusted alpha 
should therefore be lower. Given this, the net effect over the average alpha may seem small 
because the effects of both types of funds are mutually balanced. It could be concluded 
erroneously that the coskewness effect on the mutual fund performance is negligible, when in 
fact, as we shall show in Table 6, this is not the case.  
 
Table 7a and 7b show the average estimated alpha in the different models once the 
funds have been classified into quintiles according to the significance of the beta to the 
coskewness factor. In Table 7a the analysis is presented using the ( +− − SS ) factor and in 
Table 7b using the ( fRS −− ).  From these tables, we can first observe that there are clearly 
opposite effects on the mutual funds alpha depending on the sign of the loading factor of 
coskewness. For example, in Table 7a, if we consider all funds jointly in the first quintile (that 
is, the 20% of the funds with the lowest exposure to the CSK factor) the alpha changes from a 
negative value of -0.14 to a positive value of 0.04, this variation in means being statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Using the ( fRS −− ) factor we obtain the same result, with alpha 
moving from -0.03% to 0.11% in quintile 1. For the FF4 model the change in alpha is also 
significant using all the funds jointly. Similarly, for the 20% of funds with the greatest 
sensitivity to the CSK factor (Q5), the effect on alpha is the opposite, moving from a positive 
value of 0.21 to a value of 0.00 and the variation in means is also statistically significant with 
mean alpha moving from 0.07% to -0.04% using the ( fRS −− ) factor. Logically, these 
changes are not statistically significant for the central quintiles formed by funds that do not 
manage coskewness. Therefore, using the coskewness factor allows us to correct the 
performance of funds managing coskewness but does not affect those that do not manage 
coskewness. 
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A second outcome observed in Tables 7 is that a ranking based on risk adjusted returns 
without considering coskewness might result in a contrary classification between the funds in 
the extreme quintiles, where losers would be considered winners and vice versa. For example, in 
Table 7a and in the CAPM the mean alphas for the quintiles 1 and 5 are -0.14% and 0.21% 
respectively, but when the coskewness factor is considered the mean alphas change to 0.04% 
and 0.00% respectively. Moreover, the Wilcoxon test shows how the average alphas are 
significantly different among these extreme quintiles.  
 
If we carry out the analysis on categories, the conclusions remain identical. However, 
we must emphasize the different effect obtained in the Aggressive Growth and Growth Income 
Funds. Thus, in the case of taking into account the coskewness for the former in a FF4 model, 
the change in alphas is only statistically significant in the first and second quintiles, indicating a 
better performance for this category of funds. But in the case of the Growth Income category, 
the change in mean alphas is only statistically significant in the last two Quintiles (Q4 and Q5), 
generating a worse performance for this category. It must be noted that this result is in 
accordance with the movement in alphas observer for a FF4 model in the previous Table 6.  
 
As a conclusion drawn from this analysis, we could highlight that, in general, we find 
evidence of significant changes in mutual funds performance when the systematic skewness is 
considered, it being of a different sign depending on the fund’s exposure to the coskewness 
factor. Moreover, we find these changes in performance are statistically significant in 80% of 
the mutual funds sample (Q1, Q2, Q4 and Q5) when the coskewness is introduced in the 
CAPM, and are statistically significant between 20% and 40% in the FF4 model14. Once more, 
we find that the conclusions are consistent independently of the coskewness factor employed 
here. Consequently, our results might have serious effects on other mutual funds research where 
                                                          
14 The lower impact of coskewness in a FF4 model indicates as Chung et all (2006) and Vanden (2006) 
pointed out, that Fama and French risk factors  may be proxing higher order co-moments. 
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ranking on performance is required, such as persistence studies or studies of investors’ selection 
ability and flow of mutual funds. 
 
4.4 Persistence managing coskewness  
Thus far, the analysis of coskewness has considered a 44 year sample. In this long period, it is 
quite likely that the coskewness of the funds has varied over time15. Instead of assuming that the 
coskewness betas have remained constant over the whole period, it would be interesting to 
estimate them over shorter periods to appreciate, by categories, whether the coskewness beta 
changes in magnitude and sign between periods. In this section, we estimate again the models 
presented in Tables 4 splitting the sample into 3 subsamples: 1962-1976; 1977-1991 and 1992-
2006. Table 8 reports these estimations. To analyze the sign and significance of this parameter 
in each subsample we present, for each model, the alpha with and without coskewness, and the 
beta of the CSK factor.  
 
The results show that the coskewness policy does not seem constant, given that the beta 
for the CSK factor has varied over time. Thus, for example for Subperiod 1 to 2, every category 
changes from a negative and significant beta to a positive one (e.g. Aggressive Growth goes 
from -0,182 to 0,175), when CAPM is considered. When the FF4 model is considered, there is 
also a change in sign from subperiod 1 to 2 for the majority of categories. From subperiod 2 to 
3, we only find a change in sign of the coskewness beta for the Aggressive Growth and Growth 
Income category when the FF4 model is used.  
 
Hence, these results highlight the need to consider coskewness when evaluating the 
performance of mutual funds because, depending on the time period, coskewness affects them 
                                                          
15 Smith (2007) finds evidence that coskewness is time-varying and rejects the null hypothesis of constant 
coskewness. 
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in a different way16. In addition, from Table 8 we can observe that the coskewness factor is 
especially significant in the third time period for all models and categories.17 
 
On the other hand, after the previous analysis, we do not know yet if the policy of 
coskewness of a particular manager remains constant over time, because we have aggregated the 
funds in categories. However, according to Table 7, we know that within the same category 
there are funds with positive sensitivity to the coskewness factor and funds with negative 
sensitivity. Therefore, from an economic point of view it would be interesting to find out if 
certain managers might be keeping a constant coskewness policy over time and whether they 
may be profiting from the spread of coskewness.  
 
To study the above question, we use a non-parametric methodology based upon 
contingency tables. We construct a contingency table of funds called positives and negatives, 
where a fund is termed positive if its sensitivity to the coskewness factor is positive, otherwise it 
is negative. The analysis is similar to the persistence performance studies. However, in our 
context, persistence indicates those funds that are positives in two consecutive periods, denoted 
by PP, or negatives in two consecutive periods, denoted by NN. Similarly, positives (negatives) 
in the first period and negatives (positives) in the second period, denoted by PN (NP), indicate a 
reversal behavior. This contingency analysis requires a division of the sample into subperiods, 
in addition to needing funds that are alive in two consecutive periods. We have made subperiods 
of three years, although we work in a context of two periods. Thus, period 62/64-65/67 indicates 
that the beta of the factor coskewness is considered for period 62/64 and is compared with that 
obtained in the 65/67 period.18 
 
                                                          
16 We have also repeated the analysis for only 2 subsamples (1962-1980 and 1981-2006) and the results 
are very similar. We do not show them here to save space, but they are available upon request. 
17 In the second subsample (January 1977 - December 1991) the absolute t-statistics for coskewness beta 
are not statistically significant on average, but we have observed that this is because of the extreme return 
on the crack October 1987. If we estimate the models without this date, then all the t-statistics for beta 
coskewness are statistically significant, as in the third subsample. 
18 In addition to subperiods of three years, we have also repeated the analysis with subperiods of five 
years and the results and conclusions are identical. We do not show them to save space.  
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We use a Cross Product Ratio (CPR) to detect persistence in managing coskewness19. 
The CPR reports the odds ratio of the number of managers that repeat to the number of those 
that do not repeat; that is, (PP*NN/PN*NP). The null hypothesis that the coskewness policy in 
the first period is unrelated to the coskewness policy in the second one corresponds to an odds 
ratio of one.  The Tables 9a and 9b report the test statistic for the odds ratio test, using the 
coskewness factor )SS( +− −  and )( fRS −− , respectively20. In Panel A the analysis is carried 
out using all mutual funds in the database, and in Panel B only those funds that really manage 
the coskewness are considered (funds with a statistically significant beta of coskewness). 
 
Independently of the coskewness factor used, in Panel A, in general we find  some cases 
in which there is a persistence in managing coskewness (this number is higher when the CAPM 
is used) but also a similar number of cases for reversals (e.g. in Table 9a using the CAPM, the 
proportion of cases of persistence against reversals is 14/1, and using the FF4 model, it 
decreases to 7/7). Thus, one could conclude erroneously that there is not a persistence behavior 
from mutual funds managers in managing the coskewness. As we mentioned above, reversals 
appear when managers change their coskewness policy. However, these reversals could also be 
generated unintentionally, that is, when we have non significant betas that are changing from 
positive to negative or vice versa, but that are not statistically significant. In order to verify this 
issue, we analyze exclusively those funds with a significant beta of coskewness.  
 
In Panel B we present the results for those mutual funds with the coskewness beta 
statistically significant at 5%. Once we study separately the funds that truly take a policy of 
coskewness, we observe that in practically all cases, independence is rejected and that the 
reversal pattern disappears. Therefore, the results indicate that fund managers with a certain 
policy of managing coskewness tend to maintain it over time (e.g. in Table 9b, for all categories 
                                                          
19 We also conduct a Chi-square test comparing the observed frequency distribution of PP, PN; NP and 
NN for each fund with the expected frequency distribution, but given that the conclusions are identical, 
we do not show them to save space. They are available upon request.  
20 We determine the statistical significance of the CPR by using the standard error of the natural logarithm 
of the CPR (see Christensen (1990) for more details). 
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of funds and using the CAPM the proportion of cases of persistence is 7/14 for AG, 9/14 for GI 
and 11/14 for LTG, and no reversals are found) and this persistence seems to be more relevant 
in the later time periods (it could also be due to the very low number of funds at the beginning 
of the sample). Moreover, we also observe that persistence behavior is sensitive to the model 
used, being clearer when introducing the coskewness factor in a CAPM. 
 
4.5 Mutual Funds Characteristics and Coskewness 
The results of the above subsections suggest that some fund managers are managing the 
coskewness of their portfolios. The next logical objective would be to investigate the 
characteristics of those funds. Are the funds managing the coskewness the largest or the 
smallest in size? Do they charge more expenses or are they cheaper? Are they the ones with a 
higher or lower turnover ratio? To shed some light on these questions, we perform two different 
analyses: First, a univariate analysis of the mean of some characteristics, once we have 
separated the funds into three different groups according to their coskewness. Second, we use a 
Multinominal Logit model to estimate the probability of a fund having a significant coskewness 
conditional on the explanatory variables. 
 
Now, group (S-) includes the 15% of the funds with the most negative unconditional 
coskewness, (S+) the 15% of those with the most positive coskewness, and (S0) the rest of the 
funds.  Given the results of Table 3, this result is similar to separating the funds with significant 
coskewness (especially negative coskewness) from the funds where it is not significant. The 
characteristics we consider are Total Net Assets (TNA), Expenses and Turnover. They have 
been obtained from the CRSP database. 
 
The variable TNA is the closing market value of securities owned, plus all assets, minus 
all liabilities. TNAs from CRSP are reported in millions of dollars. We take logs and multiply 
them by 10,000. Given that mutual fund sizes have been growing with time and in order to 
achieve a good measure of the relative size of each mutual fund, we also divided the data by the 
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mean of the market size of the funds in each period.  Turnover is the Turnover Ratio of the fund 
(over the calendar year), that is, the minimum of aggregate purchases of securities or aggregate 
sales of securities, divided by the average TNA of the fund. The variable Expenses shows the 
Expense Ratio (over the calendar year), that is, the percentage of the total investment that 
shareholders pay for the mutual fund’s operating expenses. Given the differences over time of 
some characteristics, such as fund size, we split the sample into three periods: from 1962 to 
1976, from 1977 to 1991 and from 1992 to 2006. 
 
Results from the univariate analysis are presented in Table 10. Columns 3, 4 and 5 in 
this table report the mean of every characteristic in each period. We test the equality of the 
means and (**) indicates the rejection at the 95% level of the null hypothesis of the equality of 
means between (S-) and (S0), or between (S+) and (S0). The last column presents the equality test 
for the means of the groups (S-) and (S+).  Thus, for the first characteristic analyzed, TNA, and 
for all periods we can observe that funds managing the negative coskewness (funds in groups 
(S-)) show the smallest sizes. But the mean equality test indicates that the average sizes in the 
three groups of coskewness are not statistically different among them. The operating Expenses 
for funds in (S+) are the lowest in the first period, the means being statistically different. And in 
the last period the expenses for the funds in (S-) are higher than in the rest. Finally, the Turnover 
ratio is statistically different in mean between the groups (S-) and (S0) in the last period, the 
turnover of funds with a negative coskewness being the lowest. Moreover in all periods the 
Turnover is statistically different in mean between (S+) and   (S-) in all periods.  
 
The univariate analysis indicates some differences in the characteristics of funds related 
to coskewness. To clarify the influence on the coskewness of all these characteristics together, 
we perform a logit analysis. Logit can be viewed as a generalization of the linear regression 
model to situations where the dependent variable takes on only a finite number of discrete 
values.  Thus, the variable to explain is a dummy variable equal to one where the fund belongs 
to the 15% of the data with the most extreme negative coskewness (S-), three if the fund belongs 
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to the 15% of the most positive coskewness (S+) and two for the rest, that is  (S0) (the 
comparison group). The reason for performing a logit analysis is to estimate the probability of a 
fund having a significant coskewness conditional on the explanatory variables. The negative 
(positive) sign of the coefficient of a characteristic indicates that this characteristic has a 
negative (positive) impact on the probability of significantly managing coskewness. 
  
In addition to the characteristic considered in the previous univariate analysis and in 
order to address the different role of fund categories for the coskewness observed in Tables 4a 
to 4d, we include as an explanatory variable a dummy variable equal to one where the fund 
belongs to Aggressive Growth (DB1) and another dummy variable equal to one where the fund 
belongs to Growth Income (DB2). When both dummies are equal to zero the funds belong to 
Long Term Growth. 
 
The main results from Table 11 for the last two subsmaples (Panels B and C) are two21. 
First, increasing the turnover ratio of the funds, decreases the probability of having a significant 
negative coskewness and increases the probability of having a significant positive coskewness. 
This could be interpreted as those funds managers who are managing the coskewness and 
profiting from the coskewness spread, are those funds which are more passive. Second, being an 
Aggressive Growth fund increases the probability of having negative coskewness and decreases 
the probability of having a positive and significant coskewness. Finally, the TNA and the 
expense ratio are not significant variables to explain the coskewness of the funds.  
  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
21 The great difference in the number of available funds during the last two periods and the first one (169, 
411 and 4688 observations respectively) makes us more confident of the results obtained from the latter 
two periods. 
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5. Concluding remarks 
Recent asset pricing studies have shown that systematic skewness is important and that 
it helps to explain the time variation of risk premiums. This paper explores the role of 
coskewness in the analysis of mutual funds performance evaluation by examining a sample of 
6,819 equity mutual funds between January 1962 and December 2006. 
  
The results demonstrate that incorporating a coskewness factor as an additional variable 
increases the explanatory power of the model in both an unconditional and a conditional 
framework. The coskewness factor is significant even when factors based on size, book-to-
market and momentum are included. Therefore, a failure to consider systematic skewness could 
create a potential problem of specification that could bias the risk-adjusted return obtained by 
mutual funds and provide investors with inaccurate information about the past performance of 
mutual fund managers.  
 
From this analysis we could highlight that, in general, we find evidence of significant 
changes in mutual funds performance when the systematic skewness is taken into account. The 
sign of the variation in the performance is determined by the loading on the coskewness factor. 
Thus, if the beta of the coskewness factor is positive, indicating greater exposure of the fund to 
assets with negative coskewness, the adjusted alpha will decrease, whereas a negative loading in 
the coskewness factor increases the alpha. These changes in performances are statistically 
significant in 80% of the mutual funds sample when the coskewness is introduced in the CAPM, 
and is statistically significant between 20% and 40% in the FF4 model. Furthermore, a ranking 
based on risk adjusted returns without considering coskewness will generate a misleading 
classification and may have serious implications for other mutual funds research where ranking 
on performance is required, such as performance persistence studies or studies of investors’ 
selection ability and flow of mutual funds. 
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Finally, we document that once managers have decided to employ a certain policy of 
coskewness, betting on assets with positive or negative coskewness, they continue with that 
policy over the time. The following step was therefore to identify which class of funds uses one 
policy or another through a logit analysis. We find that some funds’ characteristics are related to 
the likelihood of managing coskewness. These are the turnover ratio (being the more passive 
funds, the funds managers who are managing the coskewness and profiting from the 
coskewness spread) and the category indicator.  
.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Mutual Funds: January 1962 - March 2006 
 Mean  Return 
Standard 
Deviation Kurtosis 
Max. 
Losses 
Max. 
Returns 
Test 
Normality 
 
Aggressive Growth  11.038 21.698 4.272 -18.777 17.574 51  
Growth/Income  7.610 14.662 4.191 -13.416 10.624 53  
Long-term Growth  7.441 17.674 4.215 -15.132 13.749 44  
All Funds 8.595 18.206 4.272 -15.854 14.192 48  
 Number of Funds 36-84 84-120 120-156 156-288 >288 >432 
Aggressive Growth  2112 1054 600 244 169 45 18 
Growth/Income  1617 751 426 197 167 76 50 
Long-term Growth  3090 1708 715 366 196 105 61 
All Funds 6819 3513 1741 807 532 226 129 
The table reports summary statistics for 6819 mutual funds in the database categorised by investment objectives: 
“Aggressive Growth”, “Income”, “Growth & Income” and “Long-Term Growth”. A fund is included in the 
investment universe if it contains at least 36 consecutive monthly return observations. For each category, we 
present in columns the annualized mean return (as a %), standard deviation (as a %), kurtosis, monthly minimum 
return (Max. Losses) and monthly maximum return (Max. Return) during the entire sample period, and the 
percentage of funds for which the null hypothesis of normality of a Jarque-Bera test is rejected at the 10% level of 
significance. The table also shows the total number of mutual funds in each category in intervals of 36-84, 84-120, 
120-156, 156-288 and more than 288 and 432 observations. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Risk Factors and Instruments 
 Market SMB HML WML S- - S+ S- - Rf 
 Mean 5.453 6.118 1.973 10.184 3.190 8.755 
 Median 9.251 6.000 1.560 10.680 2.239 8.608 
 Maximum 16.049 13.630 13.420 18.400 16.384 23.005 
 Minimum -23.134 -9.840 -21.850 -25.050 -13.422 -19.070 
 Std. Dev. 15.370 9.975 11.113 13.825 10.033 16.721 
 Skewness -0.480 0.274 -0.595 -0.650 0.481 0.007 
 Kurtosis 4.933 5.380 8.675 8.470 6.747 4.763 
 Jarque-Bera 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
 Cross Correlations 
 Market SBM HML WML S- - S+ S- - Rf 
EXRM 1.000      
SBM -0.402 1.000     
HML 0.290 -0.271 1.000    
WML -0.079 -0.041 -0.103 1.000   
S- - S+ 0.005 0.109 0.126 0.055 1.000  
S- -Rf+ 0.913 -0.310 0.277 -0.132 0.371 1.000 
This table reports summary statistics on the risk factors. The mean, median and std. dev. 
are represented in annual percentages. We show the monthly maximum and minimum 
return, and the p-value of the Jarque-Bera test. The Market factor is the excess return on 
the value-weighted CRSP NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq portfolio; SMB is the factor mimicking 
portfolio for size; HML is the factor mimicking portfolio for book-to-market, WML is the 
factor mimicking portfolio for the 1-month return momentum; S- - S+ and S- - Rf are the 
coskewness factors. Table 2 also presents the contemporaneous correlations between the 
factors included in the models. 
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Table 3: Skewness and Coskewness of Mutual Funds. 
  All Funds Aggressive 
Growth
Growth/ 
Income 
Long-term 
Growth 
Panel A: Unconditional Skewness 
Mean -0.355 -0.299 -0.455 -0.340 
Median -0.399 -0.327 -0.470 -0.391 
Positive and Sign. at 5%  4.458 7.955 1.546 3.592 
Negative and Sign. at 5%  49.890 42.330 61.534 48.964 
Panel B: Unconditional Coskewness 
Mean -0.013 -0.063 0.016 0.006 
Median -0.006 -0.065 0.029 0.014 
Positive and Sign. at 5% 7.626 4.545 8.534 9.256 
Negative and Sign. at 5% 12.011 16.241 9.895 10.227 
Panel C: iC2    
Mean -0.134 -0.531 0.093 0.018 
Median -0.018 -0.543 0.127 0.083 
Positive and Sign. at 5% 4.355 1.847 5.937 5.243 
Negative and Sign. at 5% 5.954 8.665 5.318 4.434 
t-statistic 0.826 0.841 0.857 0.800 
 
 
 
 
The unconditional skewness is computed as the third central moment over the mean. The unconditional 
coskewness is defined as )(E)(E/)(E t,Mt,it,Mt,i
2
1
2
1
2
11 ++++ εεεε , where εi,t+1 is the residual from the regression 
of the excess return on the contemporaneous market excess return and εM,t+1 is the residual of the excess 
market return over its mean. c2i is an alternative measure of coskewness from the quadratic model consistent 
with the three-moment CAPM, [ ] [ ] ittMtMitftMiitfti RRcRRccRR ν+−+−+=− 2,,2,,10,, . Significance levels 
for unconditional skewness and coskewness are computed based on bootstrap percentiles methodology (for 
a more detailed description on this methodology see Efron and Tibshirani, 1993), and we find that at 5% 
they are -0.40 and 0.40 for the unconditional skewness and 0.20 and 0.20 for the unconditional coskewness. 
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Table 4.a: Measures of Performance Using Models With and 
Without Coskewness. All Funds 
 Alpha Rm SMB HML WML CSK  R2 ADJ LR-test 
 CAPM -0.017 0.997     76%  
  (1.28) (21.47)       
CAPM +  (S—S+) -0.041 1.004    0.043 78% 0.023 
 (1.23) (21.42)    (2.54)   
CAPM +  (S--Rf) -0.019 0.992    0.013 79% 0.012 
 (1.32) (22.21)    (3.03)   
FF4  -0.140 1.015 0.144 0.077 0.036  84%  
 (1.14) (21.64) (3.70) (3.64) (3.16)    
FF4 +  (S—S+) -0.132 1.011 0.144 0.078 0.031 -0.004 85% 0.104 
 (1.15) (21.90) (3.64) (3.28) (3.05) (1.89)   
FF4 +  (S--Rf) -0.131 1.010 0.143 0.080 0.028 -0.015 85% 0.080 
 (1.17) (21.96) (3.74) (3.43) (2.46) (2.09)   
 
This table shows the OLS estimates of the models (4)-(7) for all funds analyzed in this 
paper. Alpha is in monthly units and in percentages. The absolute t-statistics are in 
parentheses. LR_test is the median right-tail probability value of a standard likelihood ratio 
test in order to determine whether there is a statistically significant difference between the 
explanatory power of the model with or without the coskewness factor.  
 
 
  
 
Table 4.b: Measures of Performance Using Models With and Without 
Coskewness. Aggressive Growth 
 Alpha Rm SMB HML WML CSK  R2 ADJ LR-test 
 CAPM 0.145 1.101     66%  
  (1.20) (14.54)       
CAPM +  (S—S+) 0.133 1.096    0.033 69% 0.020 
 (1.12) (14.42)    (2.37)   
CAPM +  (S--Rf) 0.179 1.068    -0.099 69% 0.016 
 (1.22) (14.55)    (2.73)   
FF4  -0.174 1.118 0.406 0.134 0.131  80%  
 (1.14) (16.14) (5.75) (4.00) (3.10)    
FF4 +  (S—S+) -0.143 1.100 0.427 0.176 0.117 -0.090 81% 0.097 
 (1.12) (16.09) (5.72) (3.83) (2.95) (1.78)   
FF4 +  (S--Rf) -0.134 1.097 0.414 0.173 0.092 -0.149 81% 0.090 
 (1.13) (16.04) (5.81) (3.89) (2.42) (1.93)   
This table shows the OLS estimates of the models (4)-(7) for the Aggressive Growth 
funds. Alpha is in monthly units and in percentages. The absolute t-statistics are in 
parentheses. LR_test is the median right-tail probability value of a standard likelihood 
ratio test in order to determine whether there is a statistically significant difference 
between the explanatory power of the model with or without the coskewness factor.  
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Table 4.c: Measures of Performance Using Models With and 
Without Coskewness. Growth Income 
 Alpha Rm SMB HML WML CSK  R2 ADJ LR-test 
 CAPM -0.071 0.855     82%  
  (1.23) (28.81)       
CAPM +  (S—S+) -0.132 0.884    0.099 85% 0.015 
 (1.27) (29.21)    (2.94)   
CAPM +  (S--Rf) -0.116 0.883    0.168 86% 0.001 
 (1.36) (30.92)    (3.90)   
FF4  -0.102 0.891 -0.020 0.129 -0.069  88%  
 (1.13) (29.47) (2.85) (3.54) (3.71)    
FF4 +  (S—S+) -0.117 0.900 -0.038 0.093 -0.066 0.074 89% 0.034 
 (1.19) (30.28) (2.92) (3.04) (3.64) (2.34)   
FF4 +  (S--Rf) -0.125 0.903 -0.029 0.098 -0.048 0.118 89% 0.016 
 (1.23) (30.58) (2.99) (3.27) (2.74) (2.72)   
This table shows the OLS estimates of the models (4)-(7) for the Growth Income funds. 
Alpha is in monthly units and in percentages. The absolute t-statistics are in parentheses. 
LR_test is the median right-tail probability value of a standard likelihood ratio test in order 
to determine whether there is a statistically significant difference between the explanatory 
power of the model with or without the coskewness factor.  
 
  
Table 4.d: Measures of Performance Using Models With and 
Without Coskewness. Long Term Growth 
 Alpha Rm SMB HML WML CSK  R2 ADJ LR-test 
 CAPM -0.099 1.000     79%  
  (1.36) (22.36)       
CAPM +  (S—S+) -0.111 1.004    0.021 81% 0.033 
 (1.29) (22.12)    (2.44)   
CAPM +  (S--Rf) -0.104 0.998    0.008 82% 0.030 
 (1.38) (22.88)    (2.78)   
FF4  -0.136 1.008 0.051 0.011 0.027  86%  
 (1.14) (21.29) (2.73) (3.45) (2.92)    
FF4 +  (S—S+) -0.132 1.007 0.046 0.002 0.023 0.014 86% 0.148 
 (1.16) (21.49) (2.60) (3.02) (2.81) (1.72)   
FF4 +  (S--Rf) -0.133 1.007 0.048 0.007 0.024 0.007 86% 0.124 
 (1.18) (21.50) (2.73) (3.19) (2.34) (1.87)   
This table shows the OLS estimates of the models (4)-(7) for the Long Term Growth 
funds. Alpha is in monthly units and in percentages. The absolute t-statistics are in 
parentheses. LR_test is the median right-tail probability value of a standard likelihood 
ratio test in order to determine whether there is a statistically significant difference 
between the explanatory power of the model with or without the coskewness factor.  
 
 
 
Table 5: Measures of Performance Using Conditional Models With and Without Coskewness. 
 Alpha CSK R2 ADJ LR-test Pval_F  Alpha CSK R2 ADJ LR-test Pval_F 
 Panel a: All Funds  Panel b: Aggressive Growth 
 CAPM -0.012  78%  0.10  0.178  68%  0.18 
  (1.21)      (1.06)     
CAPM +  (S—S+) -0.034 0.040 80% 0.04 0.16  0.149 0.042 70% 0.040 0.26 
 (1.20) (2.24)     (1.01) (2.10)    
CAPM +  (S--Rf) -0.017 0.008 80% 0.016 0.16  0.188 -0.093 71% 0.018 0.26 
 (1.27) (2.75)     (1.08) (2.51)    
FF4  -0.117  85%  0.17  -0.114  81%  0.22 
 (1.10)      (1.03)     
FF4 +  (S—S+) -0.113 -0.009 86% 0.103 0.18  -0.093 -0.094 82% 0.104 0.24 
 (1.14) (1.81)     (1.05) (1.69)    
FF4 +  (S--Rf) -0.113 -0.020 86% 0.081 0.18  -0.084 -0.147 82% 0.094 0.25 
 (1.11) (1.20)     (1.05) (1.85)    
 Panel c: Growth Income  Panel d: Long Term Growth 
 CAPM -0.122  84%  0.05  -0.084  81%  0.10 
  (1.26)      (1.28)     
CAPM +  (S—S+) -0.157 0.081 86% 0.026 0.08  -0.095 0.017 83% 0.049 0.14 
 (1.33) (2.57)   0.10  (1.25) (2.16)    
CAPM +  (S--Rf) -0.142 0.143 87% 0.001   -0.091 0.007 83% 0.038 0.15 
 (1.39) (3.53)     (1.33) (2.50)    
FF4  -0.128  89%  0.09  -0.114  87%  0.16 
 (1.19)      (1.10)     
FF4 +  (S—S+) -0.138 0.069 90% 0.034 0.09  -0.113 0.007 87% 0.143 0.17 
 (1.27) (2.25)     (1.13) (1.66)    
FF4 +  (S--Rf) -0.146 0.107 90% 0.021 0.10  -0.114 0.001 87% 0.114 0.16 
 (1.31) (2.56)     (1.15) (1.81)    
This table shows the OLS estimates of the conditional models (4)-(7) for all funds analyzed in this paper. We use the lagged 
level of the one-month Treasury bill yield, the lagged dividend yield of the CRSP value –weighted NYSE/AMEX and 
NASDAQ stock index, a lagged measure of the slope of the term structure and a lagged corporate spread on the corporate 
bond market as instruments. Alpha is in monthly units and in percentages and CSK is the coskewness loading factor. The 
absolute t-statistics are in parentheses. LR_test is the median right-tail probability value of a standard likelihood ratio test in 
order to determine whether there is a statistically significant difference between the explanatory power of the model with or 
without the coskewness factor. Pval_F is the median right-tail probability value of the F-test for the marginal significance of 
the term including the instruments. 
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Table 6: Distribution of t-statistics for the Alpha Coefficients 
Panel A: CAPM CAPM +(S—S+) CAPM +(S--Rf)  
 ALL AG GI LTG ALL AG GI LTG ALL AG GI LTG 
Bonferroni  p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
t<-2.291 10 3 12 15 10 3 13 14 12 3 16 16 
-2.291<t<-1.995 4 1 4 5 5 2 6 5 4 1 6 5 
-1.995<t<-1.666 5 2 5 6 5 2 8 6 5 2 7 5 
-1.666<t<0 37 32 43 38 40 31 49 42 37 29 43 38 
0<t<1.666 33 40 30 28 32 46 21 27 31 42 22 27 
1.666<t<1.995 3 6 2 2 3 6 1 2 4 7 3 3 
1.995<t<2.291 3 5 2 2 2 5 1 1 3 6 1 2 
t>2.291 6 11 2 4 3 6 1 3 5 10 1 4 
Bonferroni  p-value 0 0 0.01 0.02 0 0 0 0.19 0 0 0.02 0.04 
             
Panel B: FF4 FF4 +(S—S+) FF4+(S--Rf)  
 ALL AG GI LTG ALL AG GI LTG ALL AG GI LTG 
Bonferroni  p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
t<-2.291 10 9 10 11 10 8 11 10 11 8 13 11 
-2.291<t<-1.995 4 4 5 5 5 4 5 6 5 3 5 5 
-1.995<t<-1.666 7 7 6 7 6 5 7 7 7 6 7 7 
-1.666<t<0 50 50 52 49 49 49 52 49 49 48 52 48 
0<t<1.666 26 27 26 25 25 29 22 24 25 28 22 24 
1.666<t<1.995 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 
1.995<t<2.291 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
t>2.291 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 
Bonferroni  p-value 0 0 1 1 0 0 0.51 1 0 0 1 1 
The numbers in each column of the table are the percentages of mutual funds for which the t-statistics for the 
alphas fell within the range of values indicated in the far-left-hand column. In Panel A we show the 
unconditional models using the CAPM as a case base. In Panel B the base case is the unconditional FF4 
model Inside each type of model, in columns, we present each of the categories of funds: ALL (All Funds), 
AG (Aggressive Growth Funds), GI (Growth Income Funds) and LTG (Long-Term Growth Funds). The 
Bonferroni p-value indicates the p-values based on the Bonferroni inequality. This is computed as the p-value 
(one-tailed) associated with the maximum or minimum t-statistic, multiplied by the number of funds. It tests 
the hypothesis that all the alphas are zero against the alternative that at least one is positive (maximum value) 
or negative (minimum value). 
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Table 7a: The significance of Coskewness in performance with factor (S- - S+) 
 β(S- S+) CAPM 
(α%) 
CAMP+ (S--S+) 
    (α%) 
β(S-S+) FF4 
(α%) 
FF4 + (S--S+) 
(α%) 
All Funds       
Q1 -0.30 -0.14 0.04** -0.27 -0.15 -0.08** 
Q2 -0.09 -0.14 -0.09** -0.09 -0.16        -0.14 
Q3 0.07 -0.08 -0.12** 0.02 -0.13        -0.13 
Q4 0.19 0.07 -0.04** 0.12 -0.16        -0.16 
Q5 0.35 0.21 0.00** 0.20 -0.11 -0.14** 
       
Aggressive Growth     
Q1 -0.44 -0.04 0.22** -0.37 -0.14 -0.06** 
Q2 -0.17 0.04 0.14** -0.23 -0.16         -0.11* 
Q3 0.06 0.06            0.03 -0.10 -0.16         -0.15 
Q4 0.27 0.17 0.05** 0.04 -0.16         -0.16 
Q5 0.44 0.50 0.23** 0.21 -0.24         -0.24 
       
Growth Income     
Q1 -0.13 -0.19 -0.13** -0.08 -0.15 -0.14 
Q2 0.02 -0.17           -0.18 0.02 -0.13 -0.13 
Q3 0.09 -0.11 -0.16** 0.09 -0.09 -0.11 
Q4 0.20 0.04 -0.08** 0.13 -0.06  -0.09* 
Q5 0.32 0.07 -0.12** 0.22 -0.07    -0.12** 
       
Long-Term Growth     
Q1 -0.27 -0.22 -0.07** -0.20 -0.14   -0.09** 
Q2 -0.11 -0.21 -0.14** -0.07 -0.15 -0.14 
Q3 0.03 -0.18           -0.20 0.02 -0.12 -0.12 
Q4 0.14 -0.04 -0.12** 0.11 -0.15 -0.16 
Q5 0.31 0.15 -0.03** 0.21 -0.12    -0.15** 
This table presents the average estimated alphas in the different models once funds have been classified 
into quintiles based on the t-statistic of the beta coefficient of the coskewness factor (S--S+). The β(S- S+)  
column presents the value of the beta coefficient of the coskewness factor in each quintile. CAPM (α%) 
indicates the average alpha using the CAPM in each quintile. CAMP+(S--S+) (α%) is the average alpha as 
a using the CAPM with an additional coskewness factor (S--S+), FF4 (α%) is the average alpha form the 
Carhart model, and FF4+(S--S+) (α%) is the average alpha form a Carhart model including the coskewness 
factor. 
** means significance at the 5% level and * at the 10% level for the Wilcoxon test of differences in alpha 
distribution between the model with and without coskewness. 
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Table 7b: The significance of Coskewness in performance with factor (S--Rf) 
 β((S--Rf) CAPM 
(α%) 
CAMP+(S--Rf) 
(α%) 
β(S--Rf) FF4 
(α%) 
FF4 + (S--Rf) 
(α%) 
All Funds       
Q1 -0.57 -0.03 0.11** -0.41 -0.17 -0.07** 
Q2 -0.15 -0.16 -0.13* -0.12 -0.15 -0.14 
Q3 0.09 -0.06 -0.07 0.03 -0.15 -0.16 
Q4 0.30 0.10 0.03** 0.16 -0.14 -0.16 
Q5 0.40 0.07 -0.04** 0.27 -0.08 -0.13** 
       
Aggressive Growth     
Q1 -0.81 0.07 0.28** -0.57 -0.17 -0.04** 
Q2 -0.42 0.01 0.12** -0.34 -0.15 -0.07** 
Q3 -0.05 0.00 0.01 -0.13 -0.15 -0.14 
Q4 0.29 0.19 0.15 0.04 -0.22 -0.22 
Q5 0.49 0.46 0.33** 0.25 -0.17 -0.19 
       
Growth Income     
Q1 -0.18 -0.15 -0.12 -0.11 -0.15 -0.13 
Q2 0.06 -0.15 -0.16 0.05 -0.12 -0.13 
Q3 0.21 -0.07 -0.13** 0.15 -0.11 -0.14* 
Q4 0.26 -0.04 -0.11** 0.20 -0.06 -0.10** 
Q5 0.49 0.05 -0.06** 0.30 -0.06 -0.12** 
       
Long-Term Growth     
Q1 -0.47 -0.12 -0.01** -0.33 -0.15 -0.08** 
Q2 -0.15 -0.26 -0.23 -0.09 -0.18 -0.17 
Q3 0.04 -0.15 -0.16 0.03 -0.12 -0.12 
Q4 0.21 -0.01 -0.06* 0.15 -0.14 -0.16 
Q5 0.40 0.05 -0.06** 0.28 -0.08 -0.13** 
This table presents the average estimated alphas in the different models once funds have been 
classified into quintiles based on the t-statistic of the beta coefficient of the coskewness factor (S- 
-Rf). The β((S--Rf) column presents the value of the beta coefficient of the coskewness factor in each 
quintile. CAPM (α%) indicates the average alpha using the CAPM in each quintile. CAMP+(S--
Rf) (α%) is the average alpha as a using the CAPM with an additional coskewness factor, FF4 
(α%) is the average alpha form the Carhart model, and FF4+(S--Rf) (α%) is the average alpha 
form a Carhart model including the coskewness factor. 
** means significance at the 5% level and * at the 10% level for the Wilcoxon test of differences 
in alpha distribution between the model with and without coskewness. 
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Table 8: The Coskewness beta by subperiods 
  Panel A: 1962-1976 Panel B: 1977-1991 
 
Panel C: 1992-2006 
 
  (α%) β(S- S+) (α%) β(S- S+) (α%) β(S- S+) 
All Funds       
 CAPM 0.063  0.013  -0.022  
 CAPM +  (S—S+) 0.074 -0.089** 0.009 0.079 -0.046 0.043** 
 CAPM +  (S--Rf) 0.051 -0.191** 0.021 0.076 -0.024 0.012** 
 FF4 0.067  0.056  -0.152  
 FF4 +  (S—S+) 0.081 -0.085** 0.054 0.011 -0.144 -0.005** 
 FF4 +  (S--Rf) 0.061 -0.106 0.055 0.005 -0.144 -0.016** 
Aggressive Growth       
 CAPM -0.070  0.016  0.146  
 CAPM +  (S—S+) -0.048 -0.182** 0.007 0.175* 0.136 0.030** 
 CAPM +  (S--Rf) -0.096 -0.401** 0.036 0.179 0.184 -0.109** 
 FF4 -0.007  0.129  -0.192  
 FF4 +  (S—S+) 0.020 -0.159** 0.125 0.017 -0.159 -0.097** 
 FF4 +  (S--Rf) -0.018 -0.220* 0.127 0.007 -0.149 -0.157** 
Growth Income       
 CAPM 0.046  -0.028  -0.073  
 CAPM +  (S—S+) 0.052 -0.072** -0.022 0.007 -0.140 0.106** 
 CAPM +  (S--Rf) 0.036 -0.102* -0.022 0.014 -0.123 0.179** 
 FF4 -0.007  -0.021  -0.108  
 FF4 +  (S—S+) 0.005 -0.067** -0.019 -0.003 -0.124 0.079** 
 FF4 +  (S--Rf) -0.012 -0.074* -0.020 -0.001 -0.134 0.125** 
Long-Term Growth       
 CAPM 0.129  0.044  -0.108  
 CAPM +  (S—S+) 0.139 -0.062* 0.035 0.067 -0.121 0.020** 
 CAPM +  (S--Rf) 0.120 -0.166* 0.045 0.050 -0.113 0.008** 
 FF4 0.148  0.064  -0.149  
 FF4 +  (S—S+) 0.158 -0.068** 0.060 0.018 -0.144 0.013* 
 FF4 +  (S--Rf) 0.143 -0.083 0.062 0.009 -0.146 0.007** 
This table presents the average estimated alphas (in percentage and monthly units) and the 
coskewness loading factors for the models indicated in the far-left-column and for three subsamples 
(Panel A: 1962-1976; Panel B: 1977-1991; and Panel C: 1992-2006). ** means significance at the 5% 
level and * at the 10% level. 
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Table 9.a: Non Parametric Tests of Persistence in Coskewness Policy - Using 
factor (S- - S+)  
Panel A: Analysis with all mutual funds in the database. 
 CAPM FF4 
 Aggressive 
Growth 
Growth 
Income 
Long-Term 
Growth 
Aggressive 
Growth 
Growth 
Income 
Long-Term 
Growth 
62/64-65/67 -0.23 1.05 0.81 0.49 -0.70 0.35 
65/67-68/70 -0.41 1.18 0.00 1.65* 0.92 2.16* 
68/70-71/73 0.36 0.31 0.22 -0.92 -0.24 -0.54 
71/73-74/76 0.15 0.62 0.51 0.93 0.05 0.46 
74/76-77/79 -0.12 1.67* -0.82 1.24 -0.91 0.23 
77/79-80/82 0.60 1.10 0.37 -0.52 1.46* 1.15 
80/82-83/85 0.47 2.17** 3.62** 0.65 2.42** 1.35* 
83/85-86/88 -0.20 1.95** 1.22 -2.35 -1.66* 0.08 
86/88-89/91 -0.75 0.46 -0.95 0.67 -0.47 -1.36* 
89/91-92/94 4.47** 5.32** 4.47** -0.98 0.90 -1.60* 
92/94-95/97 0.13 2.82** 3.64** 2.56** 3.58** 3.10** 
95/97-98/00 -1.49 -0.63 -1.83** -1.60* -1.00 -2.21** 
98/00-01/03 2.22** 0.48 7.50** -1.06 -3.68** -3.71** 
01/03-04/06 8.87** 7.45** 10.66** 3.85** 0.08 0.27 
Panel B: Analysis with only those mutual funds with a significant beta of coskewness. 
 CAPM FF4 
 Aggressive 
Growth 
Growth 
Income 
Long-Term 
Growth 
Aggressive 
Growth 
Growth 
Income 
Long-Term 
Growth 
62/64-65/67 -0.47 2.00** -0.33 0.00 1.24 -1.01 
65/67-68/70 0.47 1.99** 1.06 1.55* 2.28** 2.00* 
68/70-71/73 0.24 2.21** 1.30 -0.42 0.94 0.30 
71/73-74/76 0.31 1.43* 1.55* 0.85 0.68 0.79 
74/76-77/79 0.26 0.81 1.56* 0.74 0.76 1.59* 
77/79-80/82 0.53 1.76** 3.12** 0.19 1.06 0.39 
80/82-83/85 1.55* 3.46** 4.27** 0.37 3.07** 2.03** 
83/85-86/88 2.20** 2.72** 2.81** 0.86 1.38* 2.48** 
86/88-89/91 1.15 3.84** 1.66* 1.29 1.13 3.06** 
89/91-92/94 3.43** 5.85** 6.19** 1.24 2.96** 3.61** 
92/94-95/97 2.08** 5.75** 7.10** 3.70** 4.07** 4.37** 
95/97-98/00 -1.73** 2.03** 1.64* 0.90 1.37 3.13* 
98/00-01/03 3.91** 4.41** 12.75** -0.87 -0.55 -1.73** 
01/03-04/06 10.82** 8.57** 14.89** 3.24** 3.58** 5.91** 
This table reports the Cross-Product ratio (CPR), a non-parametric test based upon contingency tables which are 
computed as indicated in section 4.4. In Panel A the analysis is carried out using all mutual funds in the 
database, and in Panel B only funds that really manage the coskewness are considered (funds with a statistically 
significant beta of coskewness at 5%). Bold numbers indicate the cases where persistence in coskewness policy 
is accepted at 5% or 10%, and underlined numbers denote a statistically significant reversal in coskewness 
policy at 5% or 10%. * indicates statistical significant at 5%. ** show statistical significant at 10%. 
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Table 9.b: Non Parametric Tests of Persistence in Coskewness Policy - Using 
factor (S- - Rf) 
Panel A: Analysis with all mutual funds in the database. 
 CAPM FF4 
 Aggressive 
Growth 
Growth 
Income 
Long-Term 
Growth 
Aggressive 
Growth 
Growth 
Income 
Long-Term 
Growth 
62/64-65/67 -0.87 0.58 -0.53 -0.84 0.25 -1.29 
65/67-68/70 -0.41 1.54* -0.57 1.55* 1.16 1.09 
68/70-71/73 -0.39 0.08 1.79** 0.07 0.32 0.00 
71/73-74/76 0.45 -0.71 0.96 0.64 -1.19 0.14 
74/76-77/79 0.16 1.50* 1.81** 1.80** -1.26 0.00 
77/79-80/82 -0.16 -0.39 0.06 0.16 0.81 1.19 
80/82-83/85 -0.39 0.39 2.75** -0.10 0.85 2.18** 
83/85-86/88 -0.10 1.54* 1.49* -0.92 -1.49* 1.90** 
86/88-89/91 1.01 1.56* 0.64 0.56 -0.15 -0.80 
89/91-92/94 4.97** 3.91** 6.08** -1.82** -0.50 -0.33 
92/94-95/97 -0.70 3.92** 3.79** 3.40** 1.69* 2.24** 
95/97-98/00 1.05 -0.38 1.42* -1.72** 1.30 -0.12 
98/00-01/03 0.23 -1.10 4.76** -2.91** -2.19** 3.43** 
01/03-04/06 -0.38 2.90** 0.68 -3.73** -7.72** -3.29** 
Panel B: Analysis with only those mutual funds with a significant beta of coskewness. 
 CAPM FF4 
 Aggressive 
Growth 
Growth 
Income 
Long-Term 
Growth 
Aggressive 
Growth 
Growth 
Income 
Long-Term 
Growth 
62/64-65/67 -0.24 1.76** -0.61 -0.37 -0.77 -1.18 
65/67-68/70 0.00 0.82 -0.70 1.40* 1.42* 1.02 
68/70-71/73 1.25 0.30 1.44* 0.19 0.68 -0.11 
71/73-74/76 0.32 0.54 0.72 1.83** 0.49 0.36 
74/76-77/79 1.08 1.97** 2.15** 0.69 0.12 1.62* 
77/79-80/82 0.56 2.04** 1.99** -1.25 0.80 0.78 
80/82-83/85 1.62* 3.13** 3.11** 0.37 1.46* 2.11** 
83/85-86/88 2.08** 1.99** 3.57** 0.56 1.23 2.74** 
86/88-89/91 2.34** 3.63** 3.68** 2.35** 2.59** 3.70** 
89/91-92/94 3.84** 4.82** 5.54** 1.23 3.18** 3.17** 
92/94-95/97 2.80** 5.60** 5.90** 3.83** 4.05** 4.42** 
95/97-98/00 0.00 0.47 2.67** 0.24 1.10 3.77** 
98/00-01/03 2.22** 1.12 6.24** 0.79 0.50 6.98** 
01/03-04/06 2.87** 6.76** 7.25** 1.65* 4.20** 5.82** 
This table reports the Cross-Product ratio (CPR), a non-parametric test based upon contingency tables which are 
computed as indicated in section 4.4. In Panel A the analysis is carried out using all mutual funds in the 
database, and in Panel B only funds that really manage the coskewness are considered (funds with a statistically 
significant beta of coskewness at 5%). Bold numbers indicate the cases where persistence in coskewness policy 
is accepted at 5% or 10%, and underlined numbers denote a statistically significant reversal in coskewness 
policy at 5% or 10%. * indicates statistical significant at 5%. ** show statistical significant at 10%. 
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Table 10: Means of the Mutual fund Characteristics grouped by coskewness 
Variables  
−S  0S  +S  Equally test 
TNA 1962-1976 7.376 7.457 7.957 0.200 
 1977-1991 7.523 7.748 7.683 0.592 
 1992-2006 6.596 6.648 6.648 0.624 
      
Expenses 1962-1976 0.009 0.009 0.007** 0.002 
 1977-1991 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.585 
 1992-2006 0.015** 0.014 0.014 0.004 
      
Turnover 1962-1976 0.837* 0.642 0.491 0.002 
 1977-1991 0.680 0.823 0.850 0.091 
 1992-2006 0.856** 0.953 0.948 0.078 
We present the mean of several characteristics of mutual funds separated into three groups of coskewness:, 
−S  includes the 15% of the funds with the most negative coskewness,  +S the 15% of those with the most 
positive coskewness, and 0S  the rest of the funds. TNA is the closing market value of securities owned, 
plus all assets, minus all liabilities. We take logs and multiply by 10,000 and also divide the data by the 
mean of the market size of the funds in each period. The variable Expenses shows the Expense Ratio (over 
the calendar year), that is, the percentage of the total investment that shareholders pay for the mutual 
fund’s operating expenses. Turnover is the Turnover Ratio of the Fund (over the calendar year), that is, the 
minimum of aggregate purchases of securities or aggregate sales of securities, divided by the average TNA 
of the fund.  
** indicates the rejection, at 95%, of the null hypothesis of the equality of means between −S and 0S , or 
between +S and 0S . The last column, presents the equality test for the means of the groups −S and +S .  
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Table 11: Relation between characteristics of Funds and Coskewness 
Panel A: 1962-1976 Panel B: 1977-1991 Panel C: 1992-2006 
Variable Marg. 
Prob. 
p-val.   Variable Marg. 
Prob. 
p-val.  Variable 
 
Marg. 
Prob. 
p-val.  
 
 
         
Intercept -1.029 0.533 Intercept -1.485 0.215 Intercept -1.651 <0.000 
TNA -0.042 0.79 TNA -0.069 0.534 TNA -0.011 0.626 
Turnover 1.239 0.01 Turnover -0.604 0.025 Turnover -0.359 <0.000 
Expenses -84.69 0.317 Expenses 27.433 0.487 Expenses 9.361 0.221 
DB1 -1.508 0.075 DB1 0.958 0.01 DB1 0.959 <0.000 
DB2 -0.523 0.354 DB2 0.876 0.018 DB2 -0.22 0.094 
               
             
Intercept 1.513 0.42 Intercept -1.58 0.066 Intercept -1.332 <0.000 
TNA -0.2069 0.193 TNA -0.04 0.643 TNA -0.005 0.797 
Turnover 0.452 0.541 Turnover 0.207 0.302 Turnover 0.1603 0.007 
Expenses -301.19 0.006 Expenses 4.268 0.902 Expenses -3.971 0.585 
DB1 -1.11 0.368 DB1 -0.379 0.314 DB1 -1.423 <0.000 
DB2 1.426 0.003 DB2 0.687 0.034 DB2 0.131 0.186 
          
Number of 
obs 
169   Number of obs 411  Number of 
obs 
4688  
Wald chi2(10) 28.53   Wald chi2(10) 23  Wald chi2(10) 345  
Prob >chi2 0.0015   Prob >chi2 0.0107  Prob >chi2 <0.000  
Log 
likelihood 
-121.4   Log likelihood -324.51  Log likelihood -3658  
Pseudo R2 0.115   Pseudo R2 0.034   Pseudo R2 0.05  
The Table reports results of a multinomial logit analysis for individual funds in which the dependent variable equals one 
if the coskewness of the fund belongs to the 15% of the funds with the most negative coskewness and equals three if the 
coskewness of the fund belongs to the 15% of those with the most positive coskewness, and zero otherwise (this is the 
comparison group). TNA is the closing market value of securities owned, plus all assets, minus all liabilities. We take 
logs and multiply by 10,000 and also divide the data by the mean of the market size of the funds in each period. The 
variable Expenses shows the Expense Ratio (over the calendar year), that is, the percentage of the total investment that 
shareholders pay for the mutual fund’s operating expenses. Turnover is the Turnover Ratio of the Fund (over the calendar 
year), that is, the minimum of aggregate purchases of securities or aggregate sales of securities, divided by the average 
TNA of the fund. DB1 is a dummy variable equal to one if the fund belongs to Aggressive Growth and DB2 is equal to 
one if the fund belongs to Growth Income. When both dummies are equal to zero the funds belong to Long Term Growth. 
Number of obs indicates the number of funds available for that time period. This table also shows the Wald test 
for testing equality of logit coefficients and the pseudo R2 for the regressions. 
1S =−1S =− 1S =−
3S =+ 3S =+3S =+
